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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN DUANE ROBISON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ALLISON ROBISON and 
THORPE ROBISON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10034 
PETITION FOR REHEA'RING 
BASIS FOR PETITION FOR REHEARI'NG 
The respondents, Allison Robison and Thorpe 
Robison, respecffully submit that fue decision of 
the Court rendered herein August '1'7, 1964, revers-
ing the judgment of the Fifth Judicial District 
Court, Millard County, does not correctly assess 
the facts, nor does it apply a correct 'standard of 
law, and departs from previous Utah prece1dent. 
This Court should grant respondents' petition for 
rehearing and withdraw its previous opinion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT LEAVES IN A 
STATE OF CONFUSION THE LAW CONCERNING 
ABSOLUTE LIABILITY. 
The opinion of the court considers the issue of 
whether the doctrine of absolute liability should 
apply and states: 
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"Whether dynamite is such a dangerous in-
strumentality depends upon the circum-
stances. Used in a crowded city, it of course 
would be; whereas, using it on a remote area 
where thel'e is little or no possibility of injury 
to others, it \Vould not. In doubtful situations 
between those extremes the problem must be 
resolved by the answer to the question as to 
whether the user should reasonably fore'See 
that others might be injured. It is to be ob-
served that even where the circumstances jus-
tify its application, this so-called rule of ab-
solute liability has the weakness of most gen-
eralities. There are almost always exceptions 
which prove them fallacious. A commonly used 
example is the application of the rule to the 
keeping of a wild animal, such as a chained 
bear. But if the person injured has deliber-
ately teased the anirnal, or been so reckless 
of his safety as to practically invite injury, 
he cannot recover. It wil'l thus be seen that 
the so-called rule of "absolute liability" is not 
absolute at all. Both the propriety of its ap-
plication in the first instance, an'd any de-
fenses against it, are conditioned by the limi-
tations imposed by the fundamental standard 
which pervades all tort law: the conduct of 
the reasonable prudent man under the cir-
cumstances; and its procedural corollary, that 
whenever there is dispute in the evidence, or 
uncertainty therein, as to \vhether that stan-
dard is met, the question is for the jury to 
determine.'' 
This sta:tement treats the instant case in a 
vacuum, and leaves the trial court with no guide 
lines as to the a'ppl'icable standards. 'To the extent 
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the court is saying that the doctrine of absolute 
liability in blasting cases is applicalble in crowded 
conditions where injury may be anticipated, and not 
applicable in rural areas where the risk of in'jury 
to adjoining property or populous is not as great, 
the court has adopted the more reasonable modern 
rule. Prosser, Torts 2nd Ed., p. 3'36 ( 19'55) ; Alonso 
1'. Hills, 95 Cal. App. 2d 778, '2'14 P.2d 50 (1950). 
However, to the extent the court applies a "re'a;son-
able prudent man" concept, it has mixed the rules of 
liability. Strict 'lia:bility applies whe~her or not the 
individual has acted prudenHy. Harper & James, 
The La1c of Torts, Vol. 2, p. 786-787. In the event 
the activity is not one encompassed by the concept 
of strict iiability, then the usual theory of negli-
gence based upon fault is applicabie. In the instant 
case, the area was remote and isolated. As J us'tice 
Henriod notes in his dissent, ''Flowell, in Millard 
County, is about as remote as you can get." 
Therefore, if the court is embracing the rule 
that absolute liability is not applicable in such cases 
it should have so expressed, and indicated that in 
this case the trial court correctly rules that the 1doc-
tl'ine was not applica11le and the standard to he 
applied is one of negligence. 
It is respectfully submitted that the majority 
of the courts have failed to acknowledge that wheth-
er the standard is one of stri'ct liability or that of 
a reasonable prudent man under the same or simi-
lar circumstances is a question of law for the judge 
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and not a question of fact. The question is not 
whether in fact a particular standard was violated, 
but what is the applicable standard, which is a 
question of law. The court seems to be saying that 
the standard in a ease like this is one of negligence 
- the absence of "conduct of the reasonab'le pru-
dent man." However, because the court implies that 
where strict liability exists such a si'milar standard 
is applicable, the opinion is uncertain. This court 
should grant rehearing and expressly determine the 
standard applicable in this case - negligence, and 
affirm the trial court's decision that absolute lia:bil-
i ty is not here applicable. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT APPLY THE CORRECT 
STANDARD OF LAW IN DE'TERMINING WHETHER 
APPE1LLANT ASSU1viE'D THE RISK. 
At the outset, it is well to note a correction in 
the court's statement. of the facts. Subsequent to 
the appellant returning in the afternoon, he dis-
cussed the blasting and assisted in preparations 
(A. D. 27). Thereafter, there was a successful blast. 
At that time the appellant had ridden his horse back 
away from the b'last site, got off his horse and g'ot 
into the pickup truck. He observed that blast in the 
truck (A. D. 28-29). Thereafter the unsuccessful 
attempts occurred. This fact is important because 
it demonstrates that initially the appellant felt it 
safer to get off his horse and wait out the blast in 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the truck, but thereafter, even after seeing that 
debris and rocks were thrown by the previous blast, 
he chose to expose himself without the truck cover. 
It seems fair to say that the court's present opinion 
is erroneous on the f.acts on a m·a teria1 point. 
The opinion of the court, in discussing the evi-
dence comments : 
''On the issue of assumption of risk, the posi-
tion of the defendants is that inasmuch as 
plaintiff was aware of the blasting with dyna-
mite, and was under no necessity of remain-
ing there, but nevertheless chose to do so, and 
in fact participated in the activity himself, 
he assumed the risk of the injury which oc-
curred. They maintain that this conclusion is 
so clear and certain that reasonable minds 
could not differ thereon, and that accordingly, 
the trial court was justified in so ruling ;as a 
matter of law. The ruling undoubtedly would 
be correct if the evidence demonstrated those 
facts to that degree of certainty." 
All the evidence before the court on the pre-
sence of the appellant, his participation, his knowl-
edge of the effect of blasting, and the ·circumstances 
of the injury ·appear in the appellant's own deposi-
tion. The facts are therefore uncontroverted. The 
question then is do these facts when applied against 
the appropriate law show an assumption of the risk? 
Yes. At the outset it shoul'd be noted that many 
other courts applying the usua'l standard of assump-
tion of risk have held that such facts conclusively 
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show an assumption of the risk of harm. Smith 11. 
Day, 117 Fed. 9156 (1902); Twohy Bros. Co. v. Ke~ 
pon, 21 Ariz. 606, 193 Pac. 296 ( 1920). The major-
ity has not seen fit to indicate wherein these cases 
vary from this one, and why they are not persuasive. 
However, it is submitted that a much more serious 
challenge can be n1ade to the majority opinion. 
First, the court has cited Prosser, Torts 2nd 
Ed., Sec. 60 (1955) as to the standard of assump~ 
tion of risk in strict liability cases. If as noted above 
this is not a strict Iiabi'lity case, the court has ap-
p'lied an erroneous standard. If the standard is one 
of "reasonable prudent men" as the opinion states 
( whi'Ch is a negligence concept), then the question 
of assumption of risk should be governed by usual 
criteria which are set out in Jacques v. Farrimond, 
T4 Utah 2d 166, 380 P;2d 133 (1963). This stan-
dard is substantially less severe than that recited in 
the se~ction quoted by the court from Prosser.l As 
against this statement it is obvious that as a matter 
of law the appellant assumed the risk. See Jacques 
v. Farrimond, supra. 
Second, if the court has applied the doctrine of 
absolute liability then the correct standard is that 
applied in the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 52'3 which 
only requires that the party have reason to know 
1 This assumes that Prosser ·is correct. It is submitted a simple 
reading of the cited cases does not truly support that standard. 
Further a more detailed analysis wil'l show the standard has 
changed since his quote, whi'ch is a restatement from his 1941 edi-
tion. 
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of the risk of harm (which the court here concedes 
all parties did) and ( 1) take part in the activity 
(which appellant did) or, (2) bring oneself within 
the area of danger (which appellant did). See es-
pecially, Harper & James, supra., Sec. 21.'5. The 
appellant can only be deemed a bare licencee, and 
must take the premises the way he finds them. He 
was as much aware of the danger from blasting as 
wPre the respondents. See also Justice Henriod~s 
telling dissent quoting Restatement Second, Torts, 
Sec. 52'3 (e) . 
Finally, it is submitted the court creates a 
serious imba:lance in this field of the law as well 
as acting inconsistently. The standard imposed 
against the respondent is necessarily high under any 
concept, whether it be strict liability or negligence. 
Certainly if the appellant is in a position to appre-
ciate the risk involved, which he obviously was, the 
same high standard must be expected of the appel-
lant for his own safety. Reason as well as justice 
demands no less. It is submitted, therefore, that this 
court should issue its opinion for rehearing and af-
firm the trial court since appellant assumed the risk. 
CONCLUSION 
It is important in the administration of justice 
that parties and counsel have guideUnes which are 
meaningful in everyday life. The instant opinion 
simply is not meaningful to trial courts or the re-
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lationships of parties in daily activity. The majority 
opinion is confusing and inconsistent and should be 
clarified. Further, in considering the concept of 
assumption of risk the holding is neither pragmatic, 
consistent, nor correct in l~aw. Rehearing should be 
granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
by--------------------------------------------------------
Rex J. Hanson 
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